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THE POPE JOHN XXIII LECTURE*
A PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE INTERBRANCH
DISPUTES ON THE PRACTICE FIELD
Paul R. Verkuil**

Separation of powers and checks and balances are ritualistic phrases in
our constitutional system that hardly need extended explanation. Suffice it
to say we are not a government of separate powers but of shared powers.
The model James Madison principally devised had more in common with

the mixed English system of John Locke than the strict French separation
model inspired by Montesquieu.1 Intentionally, our three branches each
have offices in the other. The presidential veto of legislation, the senatorial
advise and consent function over executive appointments, and the split
power to conduct and declare war are only three of the most obvious (and
fundamental) examples of our system of shared powers.
Sharing power, nevertheless, does not make the resolution of interbranch
disputes easier. As Chief Justice Burger observed in INS v. Chadha,2 our
constitutional arrangements were not designed necessarily to be easy or even
efficient-they were designed to secure liberty. Moreover, in this modern
era of divided government, where the executive and legislative branches are
controlled by different parties,3 the possibilities of friction and impasse are
* This Article is adapted from the annual Pope John XXIII Lecture delivered on April
2, 1991, at the Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. The date is of
critical importance as it speaks from the time just after the Gulf conflict when there was
greater optimism in the relationship between the White House and Congress. Since the Justice
Thomas confirmation hearings, however, that optimism may be misplaced. See Bush Launches
Strike at Congress: PresidentCalls Lawmakers "PrivilegedClass of Rulers", WASH. POST, Oct.
25, 1991, at 1.
** President and Professor of Law and Government, The College of William and Mary.
1. See generally Louis FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS POWER AND POLICY 1-27
(1972) (discussing the origins and history of separated powers from the French models and the
Articles of Confederation to the Constitutional Convention and its subsequent ratification);
Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 301, 305 (1989) ("[T]he English constitutionalism... forms the backdrop to
our own constitutional experience.").
2. 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
3. Lloyd Cutler summarized the situation well:

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 40:839

heightened. Suggestions are even made these days that the parliamentary
system, with its built-in protections against political division, might be a
more sensible way to organize our own system.4
Today, we stand at a remarkable juncture in our history of interbranch
relations. Having recently concluded a military engagement that for the first
time since World War II involved reasoned debate and action by both political branches, the conditions for a meaningful exchange of views about separation of powers could not be better. One cannot read the extensive debates
in the House and Senate on the resolution to authorize the President to enter
into a military conflict in the Gulf without perceiving a strong sense of
shared purpose and mutual respect. 5 Even those who voted not to grant the
President the power to engage in the conflict united in an admirable sense of
mutual purpose. Senator Gore aptly described the importance of this shared
feeling when he said that "[n]ational consensus is a strategic asset." 6 While
this kind of unity is often limited to international relations, this impressive
display of interbranch cooperation may result in a better understanding of
domestic matters and, specifically, the subject of interbranch relations. For
these reasons, there is a higher level of mutual respect and trust between
Capitol Hill and the White House than there has been in many years. 7 The
timing, therefore, could not be better to urge interbranch cooperation and
understanding concerning those internecine domestic disputes that often
frustrate a mutually productive relationship between the branches. Certainly the recent struggle between the White House and the Senate over the
confirmation of Clarence Thomas to a position on the Supreme Court highlights the gulf in communications that still exists. But it also demonstrates
how much the branches need to work more closely on appointment matters.
For the first 1 5 0 years, the party system had remarkable success in fostering cooperation between the branches. In thirty-five of thirty-eight elections from 1796 to
1948, the party winning the White House also won the majority of both the House
and the Senate. Taylor, Hayes, and Cleveland, I think, in his second term, were the

only exceptions. Now, of course, the opposite happens. Beginning in 1956, in six out
of nine Presidential elections we ended up with divided government. Beginning in
1968, in five out of the last six Presidential elections, twenty of the last twenty-four
years projected forward to 1992, we have had divided government.
Lloyd Cutler, hat Is Wrong with Divided Government?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 563, 565 (1990).
4. Id.
5. See H.R.J. Res. 62, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990) (discussing the branches's respective constitu-

tional roles in foreign policymaking).
6. 136 CONG. REC. S16,755 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Gore).
7. There is no way to "prove" this proposition, but the President's address to an admiring Congress on March 6, 1991, makes it hard to rebut. Jack Sirica & Gaylord Shaw, Star of
the Show; Applause for Bush in Congress, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1991, at 3.
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There are two essential questions to be asked: First, what is the legal basis
of separation of powers disputes? Are they necessary as a constitutional matter, ingrained, if you will, in tensions built into the Constitution itself, or are
they discretionary or avoidable by better communications between' the
branches? Second, what mechanisms or forums are available to help achieve
a working understanding of when and how these disputes can be avoided?
This Article proposes an analysis of the first question and a prescription for
the second.
I.

NECESSARY INTERBRANCH CONFRONTATIONS

There can be no argument that the large issues of governance are meant to
trigger friction and confrontation. The Framers, as Madison said,9 intentionally set out to protect the liberties of the people by limiting government.
Thus, debate over such basic matters as the proper roles in declaring and
coordinating war will never end; nor should conflict over the budget and
spending authority."0 In addition, many appointments and advise and consent questions are also within territory set aside for perpetual dispute. There
was, for example, practically no way to avoid the confrontation that resulted
from the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. That was an
ideological debate; it served to redefine, for better or worse, the future role of
the Senate in the advise and consent function.'1
Likewise, there are times when the President and Congress must end up in
court. When President Truman seized the steel mills to maintain production
in the midst of a labor dispute during the Korean conflict, he challenged
congressional authority in a way that forced confrontation with the industry
itself.' 2 In United States v. Nixon,' a the Court was the only institution able
to resolve the question whether the assertion of executive privilege by President Nixon could prevail over a judicial claim for presidential documents.
But other cases, such as the legislative veto case, INS v. Chadha,"4 are less
8. "Between" because it is the two political branches, not the judicial branch, that pose
most of the separation of powers challenges. Of course it is also possible that the judiciary's
interest on occasion can be involved. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding that Congress's grant of specific adjudicatory authority to bankruptcy judges violated Article III of the Constitution).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
10. See generally Louis FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 255-75 (1990).
11. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 267-349 (1990) (detailing the politicalization of Robert Bork's confirmation process from the victim's perspective).
Ironically the Clarence Thomas nomination battle, while certainly disputatious, had less to do

with ideology than character issues and how they should be addressed.
12. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
13. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
14. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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than inevitable. Admittedly, Chadha dealt with explicit constitutional provisions-the bicameralism and presentment clauses of Article I-that presidents have a constitutional duty to preserve. Politics had made the
legislative veto an accepted practice for many years and the political accommodation the device signified simply evaporated when it was extended into
new areas,-such as rulemaking review.15 That the legislative veto continues
to be employed by Congress in spending matters without presidential (or
legal) challenge suggests that it is not totally without redeeming value.
Other recent separation of powers cases are even more dubious when6
placed on the scale of "necessary" judicial challenges. Bowsher v. Synar,
and Morrison v. Olson,17 the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and independent counsel cases, respectively, were major constitutional challenges that
might have been avoided by better negotiations between the branches. Interbranch clashes must happen only in situations where important constitutional responsibilities are expressly delegated and no compromise is
contemplated by the political branches. Many other situations currently exist where clashes occur as if between enemies at night, with no real purpose
or necessity, and with corrosive consequences for national consensus. These
are the clashes that should be, at least as an initial matter, the focus of informal negotiation and resolution rather than judicial decree, because the political branches themselves have an obligation to interpret the Constitution and
not leave that task solely to the courts."8
H.

AVOIDABLE INTERBRANCH CONFRONTATIONS

There are many situations where conflict could be avoided if the political
branches would confer and compromise. There are several examples that
establish this proposition. The first involves a frequent source of conflictthe production of documents by the executive branch to Congress. There is,
at one level, no more routine practice than the sharing of information be15. It was only when the congressional use of the legislative veto extended to oversight of
policymaking and rulemaking that the practice became intolerable from the executive branch's
perspective.
16. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
17. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
18. A recent article emphasizes this point:
Excessive reliance upon the Court deceives us into thinking that these disputes are
purely constitutional in nature and that only the Justices can resolve them. Demanding judicial resolution improperly diminishes the role of the political branches in
interpreting the Constitution; emphasizing the constitutionality of a proposal diverts
attention from its often dubious wisdom.
Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 33 (1991).
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tween executive officials and congressional committees. Both branches have
strong interests in the process; Congress to perform its oversight function
and the Executive to ensure that it can perform its constitutionally assigned
tasks. Nevertheless, much occurs through accepted protocols of exchange,
even though document production and protection is a deeply political process that raises delicate issues of interbranch relations.
The contested cases frequently pit assertions of executive privilege against
congressional demands that may involve subpoenas and contempt citations.' 9 Indeed, the most famous recent contempt case against Assistant Attorney General Theodore Olson ended up testing the constitutionality of the
independent counsel mechanism. 2 ° In this case, however, and many others,
it is fair to question whether the confrontation was necessary at all. Would
better negotiating procedures between Congress and the Executive have reduced the necessary confrontations between the branches on the issue of
document production? An insightful study recently undertaken by the Administrative Conference of the United States 2' suggests that there are better
ways than litigation to resolve many of these disputes. The report advocates
a set of congressional rules and an Executive order that requires negotiation
on document production issues. The purpose of this negotiation is to
achieve compromise and to provide a mechanism for systematic recordkeeping about such disputes to help shape the future resolution of similar claims.
The overriding need is to create an atmosphere of trust that is often lacking
between the branches in these types of negotiations. Indeed, as part of its
solution, the report even suggests that neutral third party facilitators, retired
means of resolving
federal judges and the like, might offer an alternative
22
branches.
the
between
trust
disputes and establishing
Another recurring set of clashes that might be avoided centers on legislative additions (called limitations riders) to appropriation bills. Omnibus legislation with unrelated riders passed at the end of an appropriations cycle
19. See Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws:
The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987); see
also Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, ConstitutionalConfrontations: Preserving a Prompt
and Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive

Branch Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986) (advocating the use of a special prosecutor to
resolve conflicts in which the legislative demands for information are disobeyed by the executive branch).
20. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
21. PETER M. SHANE, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATING FOR
KNOWLEDGE: ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO CONGRESSIONAL DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION 41 (1990).
22. Id. at 37; see also Shane, supra note 19, at 529-39 (referring to earlier ABA efforts).
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may render the President's veto too powerful to exercise.2 3 But even if, as
Neal Devins has shown,24 it is debatable whether the President is truly deprived of his veto power in such circumstances, there are sound reasons not
to push policymaking to the last moments of the legislative cycle.
Moreover, some of these additions to appropriation bills often read like a
form of interbranch harassment. Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh highlighted several substantive provisions inserted in an allegedly
veto-proof appropriation bill for which a valid legislative purpose was hard
to divine.2 5 For example, in the 1989 appropriation for the Department of
the Interior, the following language appears: "None of the funds available
under this title may be used to prepare reports on contacts between employees of the Department of the Interior and Members and Committees of Con'
gress and their staff."26
The point of this legislation was apparently to
prevent the Secretary of the Interior, a cabinet official, from keeping track of
what his own employees were saying to congressional leaders or probing into
any charges of undue influence by interested members of Congress in executive decisions.2 7 While this action failed, it occupied more time than it
should have to resolve. 2" The whole idea of destabilizing the Executive by
encouraging bureaucratic leaks to Congress is unjustifiable. One wonders
how organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which
recently urged executive branch employees to leak information about the
Gulf War to Congress, can square its actions with legitimate executive
branch needs to protect national security.2 9
23. See Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations On the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV.
403, 406-07 (1988). Contra Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L. J. 389, 412-14 [hereinafter Devins, A
Critical Look]. Of course the whole question of whether the item veto is itself a good idea (or
indeed whether it now exists) is a subject worthy of interbranch discussion. See generally Neal
E. Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993 (1990).
24. Devins, A Critical Look, supra note 23, at 412-14.
25. Dick Thornburgh, The Separation of Powers: An Exemplar of the Rule of Law,
Opening Address Before the Federalist Society Conference Symposium (Jan. 19-20, 1990), in
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 485 (1990).
26. Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 701, 722.
27. Thornburgh, supra note 25, at 490.
28. The aftermath of the Interior incident is instructive. The White House Counsel's office advised Congress that its provision was an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power.
After this, Congress amended the provision to limit its effective date to one day-October 1,
1989. As that day had already passed, no Interior contacts were required to be logged. See
Symposium, PanelIII, CongressionalControl of the Administration of Government: Hearings,
Investigations,Oversight, and Legislative History, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 595, 598, 603 (1990). Few
would dispute that this pointless exercise should have been avoided.
29. The ACLU proclaimed before the Gulf War that lower level officials "'have a legal
right and a political responsibility'" to leak in order "'to ensure that Congress has the information it needs to perform its constitutional duties.'" Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Whistle-Blowing,
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With regard to the Interior incident, Attorney General Thornburgh concluded that "[s]uch provisions obviously represent petty politics at their
most base." 3 That is a proposition with which it is hard to disagree; however, the larger question is more central. Why had the relationship of trust
fallen to a level where such responses were forthcoming? Had the breakdown in communications between the branches reached the point where it
had to be fought out in legislative skirmishing? This kind of non-productive
exchange speaks eloquently to the need to create a forum for meeting and
conferring, in which interbranch guerilla warfare over the loyalty of government employees can be avoided. An ongoing dialogue between the main
players in a neutral setting where give and take is possible is certainly preferable to this public embarrassment.
Another situation where dialogue might be beneficial concerns the question of executive branch control of the agencies through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the related question of agency
organization, independent versus executive. During the last three administrations, attempts have been made to centralize and control the policymaking functions of the agencies through OMB's Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs. This control has been achieved through a succession of
Executive Orders 3 that have challenged congressional assumptions about
dictating agency policy and priorities through legislation, especially in regard to the so-called independent agencies. Over time, there have been accommodations on both sides that have modified the procedures whereby
OMB policy control is exercised and, at the same time, have forestalled restrictive legislation that would have frustrated the Executive's need to centralize policymaking.3 2 Nonetheless, tensions continue in this area that
could be reduced by informal communication and understanding.
The continuing issue of how best to organize agencies to perform their
missions is also one worth discussing in a neutral setting. Traditionally,
Congress has looked to independent commissions as a mechanism for asserting more control.3 3 But it is becoming increasingly clear that the Executive
ACLU-Style, WASH. PosT, Dec. 30, 1990, at C7 (quoting advertising issued by the ACLU). In
this one-sided world one wonders about such other valid constitutional duties as the President's responsibility to ensure the national security.
30. Thornburgh, supra note 25, at 490.
31. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127 (1981).
32. See, e.g., S. 1080, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 127 CONG. REC. 7938-41
(1981).
33. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 257 (explaining the potential and limitations of the independent agency as a vehicle for
making government decisions).
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can exert more policy control over independent agencies than was previously
believed, 34 and that the independent commission may not be the best vehicle
for Congress to influence policy.3 5 A sensible dialogue between the branches
about what each wants to accomplish with these commissions could greatly
assist the future effectiveness of the administrative agency as an institution.
The question of administrative agency structure also blends easily into another area where executive-legislative dialogue would be useful-that of the
delegation of legislative power and the uses of legislative history.36 Vague,
general grants of power to agencies (independent ones at least) are often
countered with overly precise statutory requirements for decisionmaking imposed upon executive agencies. The practice of writing overly complex and
detailed legislation is itself a congressional reaction to the fact that the executive branch has been in the hands of the other party for five of the last six
administrations. An article in the New York Times outlines numerous
agency Jaws "almost as complex as the tax code," citing the Environmental
Protection Agency's regulations on air pollution as a prime example,3 7 and
notes: "Bush Administration officials acknowledge that they have missed
many of the deadlines set by Congress for the new laws. But they say Congress is partly to blame because it writes laws of impenetrable complexity
with countless mandates and gives Federal agencies insufficient time to write
needed regulations.",3 ' These problems of legislative complexity, burdensome time lines, and executive recalcitrance are ideal subjects for informal
negotiation and compromise. If Congress can understand the agencies's legitimate complaints (on such matters as rulemaking timeframes, for instance), will it not be in a better position to write sensible and more
enforceable regulatory standards?
An understanding of how the Executive can best implement congressional
dictates requires a sharing of experiences on both sides. We need to do what
Michael Davidson, Counsel, United States Senate, has recently suggested34. Id.
35. Recently congress itself has considered converting one of its independent commissions, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, into an executive, single-headed agency much like
the Environmental Protection Agency. This willingness on Congress's part to rethink the organization of agencies in order to make them more effective can only be applauded. Id. at 27475.
36. See generally Symposium, Panel II, PresidentialLawmaking Powers: Vetoes, Line
Item Vetoes, Signing Statements, Executive Orders, and Delegations of Rulemaking Authority,
68 WASH U. L.Q. 533 (1990).
37. Robert Pear, U.S. Laws Delayed by Complex Rules and Partisanship,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1991, at 1.
38. Id.
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namely, to find a "common table" for Congress and the White House to
resolve these matters.3 9
III.

THE EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES

Both the executive and legislative branches have institutional mechanisms
to assist in the resolution of separation of powers disputes. They tend, however, to be branch-identified and, thereby, to foster the very lack of trust that
frustrates the resolution of "avoidable" separation of powers disputes. The
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice is the executive
branch repository of wisdom on separation of powers matters. Long headed
by astute legal advisors, including two current Supreme Court Justices, this
office prepares opinions for the Attorney General and mediates ongoing disputes over matters such as document production to Congress. The Office of
the White House Legal Counsel also works to present the Executive position
on separation of powers disputes and, when matters reach the court, the
Solicitor General's office provides the most unbiased perspe:tive of all. But
none of these Executive institutions has the capacity to serve as effective
facilitator of interbranch conflict resolution.
There is, however, an independent agency which has been increasingly
successful in securing the participation of all three branches in its deliberations. The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) exists to
improve the decision process of the administrative agencies. While its mandate is limited to matters of procedure, it is one of the few places where
government brings together members of all three branches for discussion of
resolutions that can involve settlement of interbranch conflicts.' °
On the congressional side, the institutional arrangements are similar.
Both the House and Senate have legal counsel who, like the OLC, represent
their clients well. For longer term research projects the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides astute reports and expert advice. The executive branch probably lacks confidence in CRS as an institution, however,
since its name alone expresses an identification with the congressional
branch. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) also has similar
strengths and, after Bowsher v. Synar, it has the comparable weakness of
being labelled a legislative creature.
It should not be surprising that the separate branches have created separate institutions to advise them. The difficulty is that these branch-identified
institutions are not constituted to bridge the gap between the branches any
39. Symposium, supra note 28, at 609.
40. Indeed the report prepared for ACUS by Peter Shane, see supra notes 21-22, includes
recommendations for interbranch dialogue.
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more than are the branches themselves. Institutions that are by inclination
and organization meant to have single branch loyalties are simply not focused on the issues of negotiation and compromise of representation of
proven conflicts.
There are, of course, several non-governmental organizations that can
provide less branch-identified settings for research and discussion. The most
well established is the Brookings Institution (Brookings) which sponsors
conferences, conducts research, and speaks out on important issues. This is
perhaps the most effective private organization currently at work in this regard. 4' Brookings has regular seminars for senior executive officials, members of Congress, and judges that are excellent forums for informal
discussion.42 Clearly, however, there is room for other organizations that
can offer neutral settings for discussion of interbranch problems. One can
conclude this simply by observing that the intensive conflicts described
above have not been ameliorated by existing mediating institutions.
IV.

NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING INTERBRANCH DISPUTES:
SETTING THE COMMON TABLE

The political branches themselves are undoubtedly aware of the desirability of resolving disputes in informal ways. The tensions of the last decade
have made it plain that separation of powers problems are increasingly friction prone. President Bush has toned down the rhetoric of the Reagan administration and made efforts to meet with the leadership in Congress, even
before the Gulf situation. He of course has more work to do in the aftermath of the Thomas Confirmation. Congress itself also has recognized the
need for dialogue about the confirmation process.
Recently, even the House has advocated the creation of new mechanisms
to help solve the problems of communication. In July 1989, the Committee
on Legislative Appropriations, chaired by Congressman Vic Fazio, invited
new ideas for resolving old problems:
The Committee is concerned about a number of issues the Congress must address involving constitutional process and policy. Issues of this type include impeachment, the budget process, the
advise and consent role, constitutional amendment procedures,
war powers, and the legislative veto. Because of this concern, the
41. Other valuable organizations include the Center for the Study of the Presidency in
Charlottesville, Virginia, and the Carl Albert Center in Oklahoma.
42. Brookings does have something of a reputation as a government in exile which conceivably affects its position as a neutral organization. The presence of other organizations such
as the American Enterprise Institute, and the practice of jointly sponsoring projects between

them, however, make that a limited concern.
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Committee believes there is a need to have a central point of analysis and review of matters affecting Congress and the constitutional
process.... [T]he Committee will review this need and consider
approaches to providing the necessary independent analysis to the
Congress.4 3
The importance of responding to these concerns has been recognized by
several organizations." The Catholic University of America, Columbus
School of Law, and the College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, have proposed a collaborative venture-the Center for Interbranch Relations and the Constitutional Process. The Center plans to draw
upon the resources of the combined universities to engage in the following
activities:
1. Task forces to examine instances of interbranch conflicts that are susceptible to effective negotiation. These task forces will involve affiliated scholars, students, and government officials.
2. Seminars and conferences on contentious issues of separate and
shared powers. What better time, for example, to discuss the future of
the war powers amendment in light of the Gulf experience and to
compare it to the experience of Iran-Contra?
3. Internships for students with members of Congress and the executive
branch relating to interbranch problems.
4. Research and data collection in both law school libraries, publication
of significant findings in the two law schools's law reviews and, as
appropriate, in the Administrative Law Review which is housed at the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
5. Provision of a "practice field," a neutral setting for exploring and negotiating interbranch disputes and settling them, if at all possible, in
private, rather than in court. This is a prime function of the Center,
and it cannot come about overnight. It will only happen as the Center
43. H.R. REP. No. 179, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).
44. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, and the College of

William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, have joined to establish the Center for
Interbranch Relations and the Constitutional Process. The Catholic University Center will be
devoted to helping Congress resolve extraordinary interbranch clashes, such as those that Congressman Fazio described. Congressman Fazio cites several examples of what I have labelled
here as unavoidable conflicts, but the process of categorization is itself part of the challenge of

any interbranch dispute resolution center. The Center will serve as a resource center, a source
for expert testimony, and a setting for consultation with congressional officials. The thrust of
the William and Mary Center will be long-term research, document collection and retention, a
conference capacity, and a visiting fellows program. A center with instant access and one that
offers the opportunity to reflect, provides an ideal environment for quick, as well as educated,
decisionmaking.
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gains credibility within the political branches as a forum for neutral
and objective research.
In addition, there is an international dimension to the Center's work that
grows in importance with events that are unfolding in Eastern Europe. Congress has recognized the need to support emerging democracies in Eastern
Europe through the establishment of its Support for Emerging Eastern European Democracies (SEED) program. Similarly, the American Bar Association (ABA) has taken the lead in providing legal advice on
constitutionalism to the Eastern European countries through its Central and
East European Law Initiative (CEELI) program. The United States is in a
unique position to play an important role in shaping the democracies of the
future. One fascinating element in the constitution drafting that is now occurring is the preoccupation with separation of powers. In countries where
all functions of the state were in the hands of the Communist leadership, the
need for offsetting and balancing political branches is fundamental to reform. The work of the Center could be invaluable in helping these countries
understand the significance and limitations of separation of powers in the
presidential or even parliamentary setting. By working closely with established organizations like the ABA, Brookings, the CRS, and other related
entities, the Center for Interbranch Relations and the Constitutional Process
can serve a valuable educational function at this critical time in world affairs.
V.

CONCLUSION

These are ambitious goals for any organization, but especially for a neophyte group. Fortunately, the Center for Interbranch Relations and the
Constitutional Process benefits greatly from the quality of individuals who
have agreed to serve as participants and advisers. The Center is capable of
making a difference in increasing the effectiveness of decisionmaking in our
national political system, both here and in the creation of new systems
abroad. Indeed, its research efforts will be of relevance to state governments
as well. All in all, these are formidable challenges, but the need for a neutral, non-governmental "practice field," where debate between the branches
can occur without penalty or posturing, has never been greater.

